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In [3, 4] the present authors and colleagues have provided a model of organisations of agents
in terms of policy-based normative systems. An organisation is thus characterised by specify-
ing the normative positions relevant to design its structure. This abstract summarises further
results in this direction1. In particular, the research provides a computational framework based
on Defeasible Logic to capture some theoretical intuitions developed in [3, 4]. The focus is on
the idea of institutionalised power, as represented by the counts-as link, and on two aspects of
agency: the notions of attempt and of personal and direct action to realise states of affairs. For
the first issue, we adopted the approach of [3, 4], inspired, with some differences, by [5, 6].
For the second aspect, the reference is to recent developments of the Kanger-Lindahl-Po¨rn
theory of action [7, 8, 6]. The model embeds also the modal operator proc, which represents
the act of proclaiming to capture some minimal properties of all speech acts that are intended
to modify the institutional world [3, 4]. The goal of the research is computational insofar as
it proposes an efficient and flexible formalism to deal with counts-as conditionals and their
interplay with agency. In fact, [4, 3], but also [5, 6], can hardly be used directly for imple-
mentation since they are based on conditional logics. On the other hand, this research aims
also to provide some hints to define a non-monotonic theory of agency.
Our logic of institutional agency is based on the framework for Defeasible Logic de-
veloped in [1, 2]. The idea is to extend this framework to account for: (1) the underlying
logical structure of any propositional base describing an institution; (2) the logic behavior of
the modal operators of institutional agency; and (3) the relationships among such operators.
The logic of agency should specify how modalities can be introduced and manipulated. To
comply with this, in the setting provided by Defeasible Logic we have to set 1) the rules de-
scribing the logical inferences within the institution and 2) the rules to introduce the modal
operators of agency Ei (the agent i brings it about), and Hi (the agent i attempts). Accord-
ingly, two types of rules (strict, defeasible, and defeaters) are considered: rules for the notion
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1Motivation and details of the research are provided in the full version of this paper, which is available at
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of counts-as and rules for the notion of results-in. The language of Defeasible Logic is ex-
tended with a set of action symbols; αi,βi,γi, which denote atomic actions, may occur in the
rules. The meaning of an action symbol αi is that the action corresponding to it has been per-
formed by the agent i. In this perspective, a defeasible institutional action theory is a structure
I = (A,F,Rc,{Ri}i∈A,>) where, A is a finite set of agents, F is a set of facts, Rc is a set of
counts-as rules (i.e.,→c,⇒c,;c), {Ri}i∈A is a family of sets of results-in rules (i.e.,→i,⇒i,
;i for each agent i ∈ A), and >, the superiority relation, is a binary relation over the set of
rules (i.e., >⊆ (Rc∪RA)2), where RA = ⋃i∈A Ri. The intuition is that, given an institution I,
F consists of the description of the raw institutional facts, either in form of states of affairs
and actions that have been performed. Rc describes the basic inference mechanism internal
to an institution, while RA encodes the transitions from state to state occurring as the results
of actions performed by agents within the organisation. The crucial notion in this model is
that of derivability. Counts-as rules and conditions for derivation involving them produce the
institutional facts that hold within the institution. However, the machinery requires also to
account for action transitions that are recognised by the organisation. Accordingly, the in-
troduction of the modalities of agency within the institution is obtained as the output of the
general definition of derivability that involves counts-as as well as results-in rules. Suppose
the agent i is acting in the context of an auction2:
r1 : raises handi, auction begun⇒c bidsi r2 : bidsi ⇒i offer
If no attack is possible, i’s fulfilment of the conditions of r1 produces offer: i’s action of
raising one hand has the result that i has made an offer, and so the derivation of offer permits
to introduce Ei(offer). But the framework can deal with more complex scenarios where, e.g.,
i acts on behalf of the agent j. In this perspective, we may have rules such as the following:
r3 : bidsi, proci(E joffer)⇒ j offer r4 : proci(E joffer),raises handi ⇒c bids j
Rule r3 means that the fact that i makes a bid and proclaims that j makes the offer may permit
to introduce E joffer, while r4 expresses that i’s proclamation that j makes an offer counts as
j’s action of bidding.
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2Bold type expressions correspond to action symbols, the italicised ones to state of affairs.
